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Abstract 
 
During the 1997 Korean financial crisis, typical Korean firms lost substantial part of their market value. 
We show that firms that are financially weak and those that maintain close ties to the main bank experience 
a larger drop in the value of their equity. In contrast, firms with large equity ownership by unaffiliated 
investors and those with alternative means of external financing experience a smaller drop in share value. 
We also find that Korean firms experiencing the economic shock rely more heavily on the asset sales as 
their restructuring mode and downsize more frequently than do firms experiencing performance shock. 
High leverage or concentrated ownership by owner-managers of chaebol (business group) firms decreases 
the likelihood of downsizing, but increases the probability of expansion. We further demonstrate that 
downsizing (expansionary) actions have a positive (negative) effect on the value of chaebol firms. Our 
results suggest that firm value and the nature of the restructuring process during the economic crisis are a 
function of firm-specific characteristics and owner-manager incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of Asia in 1997 provides an unprecedented opportunity for academicians to 
investigate several important issues related to the crisis, such as the causes of the financial crisis, the impact 
of the crisis on bank stocks, the behavior of foreign portfolio investment, etc. However, there has been little 
investigation on the impact of the crisis on firm value, its cross-sectional determinants, and restructuring 
activity responding to the crisis. These issues are important in understanding the nature of firms since the 
ability of firms to respond to an unexpected external shock and the determinants of these responses are 
important factors that affect their organizational efficiency. In this study, we explore the impact of the 1997 
Korean financial crisis on firm value and the nature of corporate restructuring activities subsequent to the 
crisis. We also examine the factors that determine the change in firm value triggered by the economic shock 
and the likelihood and the type of restructuring activities.  
Although there is extensive literature on the restructuring activities caused by firm-specific performance 
declines or takeovers,1 relatively little is known for those triggered by adverse economic shock. Previous 
studies show that following the performance decline, there is a high frequency of corporate restructuring 
and a significant improvement in operating performance (John, Lang, and Netter, 1992; Kang and 
Shivdasani, 1997; Denis and Kruse, 2000). Since the unexpected economic shock in Asia imposes 
tremendous financial constraints on firms, implementation of various restructuring activities such as asset 
restructuring, employee layoffs, and changes in internal operations should be inevitable to overcome the 
shock. However, the nature of corporate restructuring activities may differ dramatically between those 
caused by poor performance and those by an adverse macro shock. Although poor performance under a 
                                            
1 See for example, John, Lang, and Netter (1992), Ofek (1993), Berger and Ofek (1995), John and Ofek (1995), 
Kang and Shivdasani (1997), and Denis and Kruse (2000). The only exception is Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) who 
show that the interindustry patterns in the rate of takeovers and restructurings are directly related to the industry 
shocks. 
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normal economic condition prompts managers to realize relative inefficiency of their firms and induce them 
to undertake several restructuring activities, an economic shock adversely affects all firms to varying 
degrees. For example, difficulties of the economy and credit crunch during the financial crisis tend to 
increase the cost and availability of external financing for most of the firms. In this circumstance firms are 
more likely to choose restructuring modes that can provide immediate liquidity for survival than to choose 
those that increase their long-term competitiveness. In this paper we attempt to show that corporate 
restructuring activities caused by an economic shock are different from those caused by performance 
decline. 
In addition to adding insight into the nature of corporate restructuring activities, our research can also 
enhance understanding of the determinants of both firm value and restructuring activities. Unlike the 
previous studies that examine the relation between firm value/corporate restructuring and their 
determinants during the normal economic condition, our paper focuses on the relation under an exogenous 
macro shock. This allows us to examine the determinants of both firm value and restructurings in an 
unambiguous way. In other words, since we use a given set of firm characteristics immediately before the 
external shock to explain the change in firm value and restructurings, a spurious causality caused by 
endogeneity problem can be largely eliminated in our analysis. 
Our paper is also motivated by the controversy surrounding the nature of business groups in global 
economies. On the positive side, Khanna and Palepu (2000) compare the profitability of Indian firms that 
belong to industrial groups to that of independent Indian firms, and show that diversified business groups 
add value. Importantly, Shin and Park (1999) show that because of their internal capital markets, Korean 
firms that belong to the top 30 business groups (hereafter called the “chaebol firms”) are subject to less 
financing constraints than are other Korean firms. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) also examine the 
sensitivity of Japanese firms’ investment expenditures to liquidity and find that this sensitivity is lower for 
firms in bank-oriented keiretsu. At the same time, however, it is not clear that business groups around the 
world always add value to their member firms. For instance, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2000) show that controlling shareholders in European business groups have strong incentives to 
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siphon resources out of the firm to increase their wealth. Furthermore, according to Bae, Kang, and Kim 
(2001), although minority shareholders of firms belonging to the top 30 Korean chaebols typically lose 
from the acquisitions they make, controlling shareholders of these firms gain from the acquisitions.  
From our perspective, one notable feature of the chaebol is that ownership is heavily concentrated by 
one individual who has almost complete control over all firms within the group. Such an ownership 
structure gives the owner-managers of chaebols strong incentives to diversify their wealth and human 
capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981) and to expand their chaebol into several different industries. Despite the 
significant contribution of the chaebols to the fast growth of the Korean economy during the last 40 years,2 
it has been criticized that much of the chaebol’s business expansion has come from excessive borrowing3 
and that the owner-managers of chaebols have expropriated other investors by investing the firm's resources 
to maximize their own or the group’s welfare (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2001). We investigate whether the 
characteristics of these ownership and capital structures have an effect on firm value and restructuring 
during the crisis period.  
We find that the economic crisis in Korea has a significant and negative effect on the market value of 
firms, but with a large cross-sectional variation. Firms that are highly levered, borrow more from the banks, 
and are small and risky experience a larger drop in the value of their equity. In contrast, firms with large 
equity ownership by financial institutions and foreign investors, those with alternative means of access to 
capital markets, and those with high ratio of exports to sales experience a smaller drop in share value.  
The restructuring activity that is most frequently undertaken by Korean firms under the economic shock 
is asset sales. We find that 36.8 percent of our sample firms engage in asset sales. This number is 
                                            
2 As of the end of 1998, the top 30 chaebols account for 11.97% of total GNP, 47.79% of total corporate assets, and 
46.54% of total corporate revenues. See Bae, Kang, and Kim  (2001) for a detailed discussion on the importance of the 
top 30 chaebols in Korea. 
3 During the period of 1993 to 1998, the average debt to total assets ratio of listed firms in the top 30 chaebols 
amounts to 77.18%. In contrast, debt to total assets ratio for listed non-chaebol firms is 65.62%. This difference in the 
leverage ratio is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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abnormally high compared to the findings of Kang and Shivdasani (1997) and Denis and Kruse (2000) who 
examine restructuring activities of Japanese and U.S. firms, respectively, during performance decline. It is 
also considerably higher than the finding of Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) who investigate corporate 
restructuring actions during performance decline in Korea. Our sample firms also show substantially lower 
frequency of expansionary actions than those presented in the studies of Kang and Shivdasani and Kang, 
Lee, and Na. These results suggest that unlike performance decline, the economic shock forces many firms 
to focus on the restructuring mode that can provide immediate liquidity for survival. We also find that the 
likelihood of downsizing actions (asset downsizing or layoffs) is positively related to the size of the firm, 
the ratio of main bank loans to total assets, equity ownership by outside investors such as financial 
institutions and foreigners, and the membership to the chaebol. In contrast, the frequency of downsizing 
actions is negatively related to the change in the market value of equity caused by the external shock, 
indicating that firms are more likely to downsize when the adverse effect of the economic shock is larger. 
For chaebol firms with high leverage ratio or those with concentrated equity ownership by the controlling 
shareholders, we find that there is a higher probability of expansionary actions, but a lower probability of 
downsizing actions. Thus, our results indicate that chaebol firms characterized by either high leverage or 
concentrated controlling ownership continue to seek maximization of firm size even during the crisis 
period.  
The downsizing activities on average have a positive effect on firm value. We find that shareholders of 
firms that engage in either asset sales or layoffs realize a significantly positive 11-day cumulative mean 
abnormal return of 2.47 percent surrounding the initial announcement date. The analysis of the subsamples 
shows that chaebol and non-chaebol firms experience similar magnitude of the mean abnormal returns, 2.60 
percent and 2.26 percent, respectively. In contrast, the mean announcement return for firms expanding into 
different industries is –12.42 percent, which is significant at the 0.01 level. However, the negative returns 
are mainly from diversification strategies by chaebol firms. Non-chaebol firms that undertake diversifying 
expansion experience an insignificantly positive 11-day cumulative mean abnormal return of 2.81 percent. 
These results suggest that expansionary policies of chaebol firms are viewed unfavorably by investors in 
 4 
the stock market. They are also an indirect indication that overinvestment caused by the agency problem 
between the controlling and minority shareholders was more severe for chaebol firms than for non-chaebol 
firms prior to the crisis. 
The analysis of the long-term industry-adjusted operating performance following the downsizing actions 
without expansion shows improvement in performance, but this improvement in operating performance is 
only evident for chaebol firms. The expansionary policies without downsizing, however, do not lead to an 
improvement in operating performance for chaebol firms.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how the change in firm value and restructuring 
activities caused by an economic shock are related to firm specific characteristics. Section 3 describes data 
and sample characteristics. In Section 4, we show the results from our empirical analysis. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
  
2. The determinant of firm value and restructuring: The hypotheses 
 
The hypothesis we want to test is that certain firm specific characteristics play an important role in 
determining the change in firm value caused by an economic shock and the likelihood that certain 
restructuring actions will be observed. In this section, we discuss several explanatory variables that may be 
related to change in firm value and the nature of restructuring activities.  
 
• Chaebol.  In Korea, a large business group is often called a chaebol. The Korea Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) defines a business group as “a group of companies of which more than 30 percent of shares are 
owned by the group’s controlling shareholder and its affiliated companies.” Each year the KFTC ranks 
business groups according to the size of their total assets and identifies the top 30 business groups. Chaebol 
firms operate in many different industries, are bound together by a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, 
and maintain substantial business ties with other firms in their group. Chaebol firms are also characterized 
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by an extensive arrangement of reciprocal shareholding agreements and the cross-debt guarantees among 
the member firms. Even though the chaebol’s owner-managers put up a relatively small portion of the total 
stake in the group, the owner-managers have full control over all member firms. This is made possible 
because there are reciprocal shareholding agreements among chaebol firms and because there are so few 
mechanisms to control the discretionary power of owner-managers. Thus, they can easily expropriate 
minority investors in the chaebol by investing the firm’s resources to maximize their own or the group’s 
wealth, even when such investments do not maximize the value of the firm.  
A priori, it is unclear as to what effect the chaebol affiliation has on firm value and restructuring 
activities during the period of the economic crisis. If chaebol affiliation facilitates investment policies that 
delay the exit of a distressed member firm during the shock period, it could have a detrimental effect on the 
value of other affiliated firms within the same group, but have a positive effect on the value of the distressed 
firm. Alternatively, if risk-sharing among chaebol-affiliated firms and the operation of an internal capital 
market within chaebols allow member firms to bypass the external shock, the structural form of diversified 
business groups can have a positive effect on the value of their member firms. Furthermore, if influential 
entities such as owner-managers or regulatory agencies actively intervene in the restructuring process of 
chaebol firms, we would expect the likelihood of downsizing to be positively associated with the 
membership to the chaebol. However, if chaebol owner-managers make a restructuring decision within a 
chaebol by placing more emphasis on maximization of the size of their chaebol instead of focusing on the 
value of an individual firm, we would expect that chaebol firms engage in downsizing less frequently than 
non-chaebol firms. We use a dummy variable that equals one if a firm belongs to one of the 30 largest 
business groups. 
 
• Ownership structure.  Ownership structure is known to be an important factor in determining firm value  
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and has a significant effect on corporate restructuring (Kang and Shivdasani, 
1997; Denis and Kruse, 2000). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), concentrated ownership by 
owner-managers provides them with incentives to make value-maximizing decisions, and thus minimize 
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the agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control.  
However, if substantial discretionary power held by controlling shareholders allows them to receive 
private benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000; Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2001), such power may have a negative effect 
on firm value and weaken the ability of firms to effectively respond to the shock. Furthermore, since 
chaebol firms often buy and sell goods and services from one another, and because they are connected by an 
extensive arrangement of reciprocal shareholding agreements, owner-managers of these firms might be 
more concerned about the maximization of the group size than an individual firm value. These arguments 
suggest that chaebol firms with high concentrated ownership by the owner-managers are less likely to 
engage in downsizing actions, but are more likely to engage in expansionary actions. We measure the 
controlling ownership of the firm by the sum of equity ownership by the largest shareholder 
(owner-manager) and equity ownership by affiliated corporate shareholders.  
Korean financial institutions and foreign investors hold a large fraction of voting rights in many firms. 
According to Shleifer and Vishiny (1986), such large outside ownership can provide incentives for them to 
monitor managerial performance and to take actions that enhance firm value. Kang and Shivdasani (1997) 
show that the frequency of asset downsizing and layoffs in Japanese firms increases with the ownership by 
the firm’s main bank and other blockholders. Using data from India, Khanna and Palepu (1999) find that as 
emerging markets integrate with the global economy, foreign institutional investors serve a valuable 
monitoring function. To the extent that financial institutions and foreign investors play an important 
monitoring role, we would expect that firms with high ownership by such investors suffer less from the 
economic shock and take more actions that preserve or enhance firm value. We measure the importance of 
outside shareholders by the ownership of several institutional investors such as banks, other financial 
institutions, foreign investors, and non-affiliated firms.  
 
• Capital structure.  Lang and Stulz (1992) and Opler and Titman (1994) find that firms that maintain high 
leverage ratio and have specialized business lines tend to experience more difficulties during the period of 
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economic downturns. Since highly levered firms would have more difficulty obtaining external financing 
during the financial crisis period, we expect such firms to experience a larger drop in the value of their 
equity. In particular, the financial crisis of Asia brought about a substantial increase in interest rates and 
severe credit crunch in financial markets, which leads even firms with positive operating income to go into 
financial distress. Therefore, highly levered firms should suffer significantly more from the adverse shock.  
However, leverage performs an important governance function. Jensen (1986) argues that debt-service 
obligation induces highly leveraged firms more likely to restructure when their value declines. Consistent 
with this prediction, Ofek (1993) shows that high leverage increases the likelihood of asset restructuring 
and employee layoffs. We measure leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
The composition of debt would also have an effect on the change in firm value and restructuring 
activities. Korean firms have traditionally relied heavily on bank financing and maintained close long-term 
ties with their main banks. The main bank is particularly knowledgeable about the firm’s prospects and 
plays the role of a manager of a loan consortium in obtaining financing for its client firms. The main bank 
can also perform the role of an insurer, because implicit long-term contracts with the firm can create 
incentives to provide necessary assistance when its client firms are in financial trouble. Therefore, firms 
with a close relationship with main banks are expected to receive strong support from these banks when the 
economy as a whole experiences difficulties. This argument suggests that the strength of a firm’s ties to a 
main bank has a positive effect on firm value. To the extent that substantial debt claims held by the main 
bank provide monitoring incentives that are lacking in diffuse investors, we also expect firms with close ties 
to the main bank more likely to restructure when their value declines. We use the ratio of main bank debt to 
total debt to measure the strength of a firm’s ties to a main bank. As an alternative measure for the bank tie, 
we also consider the fraction of bank debt to total debt.  
However, given that an economic shock adversely affects banks as well as firms, one would expect it to 
have a more negative effect on firms that maintain close ties to the bank. If banks are forced to curtail 
lending due to an exogenous shock, their borrowers will have to turn to more expensive sources of external 
financing and thus lose the benefits of the durable bank relationship for the future. According to this 
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argument, firm value is more likely to fall when a firm borrows more from the banks. It also suggests that 
firms that have the ability to raise capital from either bond or stock markets experience a small drop in share 
value, since these firms have access to alternative sources of financing when their main banks are in 
financial distress. Kang and Stulz (2000) show that Japanese firms that borrow more from banks suffer 
larger drops in stock prices and cut investments back more substantially from 1990 to1993, during which 
the whole banking sector in Japan was experiencing difficulties. Further, Bae, Kang, and Lim (2001) show 
that Korean firms that have high bank loan ratios experience a large drop in the value of their equity when 
their main banks experience adverse external shocks. They also find that firms that have fewer alternative 
means of external financing suffer more from the adverse shocks to banks. To examine the possible 
substitution effect of bank financing, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s debt 
includes public bonds that are not guaranteed by the third party and a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm is listed on a foreign stock exchange.  
The financial crisis of Korea in November 1997 can be characterized by a large drop in the value of its 
currency. The exchange rate at the end of October 1997, which is approximately one month prior to Korea’s 
seeking a rescue package from the IMF to control the financial crisis, was 902 won per U.S. dollar, but by 
the end of December 1997, the rate went up to 1,836 won per dollar, effectively devaluating the won by 
more than 100 percent. This sharp fall in the currency price means that the firm with a higher fraction of 
foreign debt in its capital structure suffers more from the economic shock. It also means that, to preserve its 
value, such a firm is more likely to respond to the economic shock by restructuring its operation (Jensen, 
1986). We calculate the foreign debt ratio as the ratio of borrowings from foreign financial institutions and 
foreign firms to total debts. The currency crisis in Korea also suggests that the ability of firms to secure 
foreign capital should have a positive affect on their market value. However, when firms are capable of 
securing access to foreign capital during the crisis period, the probability of a financial distress tends to be 
reduced. This diminishes firms’ need for restructuring actions, thus making them less likely engage in such 
actions. We use the ratio of exports to sales to measure the strength of firms to secure foreign capital. 
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• Liquidity.  When firms experience a large economic shock, they could use external capital markets, utilize 
internally generated cash flows, or curtail new investments. Financially less constrained firms or firms with 
internal sources of financing would therefore suffer less from the economic shock. For example, firms with 
more cash flow and those with more liquid assets are likely to have less demand for external financing and 
will, therefore, experience a less drop in the value of their equity. In terms of restructuring, these firms are 
less likely to engage in asset contraction policies, since their demand for short-term cash flow is relatively 
small compared to firms with less liquidity. As a measure of liquidity, we use the ratio of cash flow to total 
assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. We compute cash flow as the sum of operating income 
and depreciation. Liquid assets are cash plus marketable securities. 
 
• Size.  The size of the firm is another important variable that affects its ability to raise the capital, 
particularly when the overall economy experiences difficulties and the financial institutions become 
concerned about the credit quality of their customers. It is argued that large firms generally have better 
capability to secure external finance, are unlikely to rely mostly on bank borrowing for their financing, have 
smaller informational asymmetries, and are more established. Large firms also tend to have a large asset 
base that can easily be used as collateral. All these suggest that large firms are less vulnerable to an external 
shock and thus suffer less from the adverse shock. However, it is unclear as to what effect the firm size has 
on restructuring activities. Given that large firms have more asset bases and more human resources than 
small firms, we would expect that large firms are more likely to engage in downsizing activities such as 
asset sales and employee layoffs; however, to the extent that large firms tend to be less affected by an 
external shock, it is equally possible that they are less likely to undertake downsizing actions. We measure 
firm size as the logarithm of total assets. 
 
• Risk and Performance.  Risk and past performance can also have an effect on firm value and 
restructurings. Risky firms generally have high default risk and are therefore more vulnerable to the 
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external shock. In a similar vein, firms with poor past performance have high probability of a financial 
distress during the crisis period and thus are more likely to lose their growth opportunities in the future. 
These arguments imply a negative relation between risk and firm value and a positive relation between past 
performance and firm value. They also suggest that firms with high risk and those with poor past 
performances are more likely to implement active restructuring plans as firm value falls. Risk is measured 
by beta, which is estimated by the slope of the market model regression. We use one-year daily stock 
returns during the 1996 period to estimate beta. In addition, we use the variance of the market model 
residual to measure the risk of a firm. Past performance of the firm is measured by the market-adjusted 
cumulative excess returns during the 1996 period, Tobin's q (book value of debt plus market value of 
equity/total assets), and a dummy variable that equals one if pre-tax operating income is positive. The value 
of zero in the operating income dummy is intended to capture extremely poor operating performance. 
 
3. Sample selection and data  
 
Our sample consists of 644 nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) 
between November 1997 and December 1998. There are a few reasons to focus on the period of November 
1997-1998. First, Korea abandoned the defense of the currency on November 18, 1997 to control the 
financial crisis and sought a rescue package from the IMF on November 22, 1998. Second, the stock market 
plummeted from 520 prior to the shock to almost bottom by the end of December 1997 recording the lowest 
point of slightly above 300. Finally, many Korean firms announced and implemented various restructuring 
activities during this period to overcome the financial crisis.  
We obtain the stock price data of the firms from the daily return files of the Korea Investors 
Service-Stock Market Analysis Tool (KIS-SMAT) and Stock Database of the Korea Stock Research 
Institute (KSRI), which include all firms listed on the KSE. Financial data and bank loan data are obtained 
from the Listed Company Database of the Korean Listed Companies Association and the firms’ annual 
audit reports, respectively. We obtain the list of the main bank for each client firm from the Annual 
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Statistics published by the Korean Listed Companies Association. The Korean Listed Companies 
Association compiles and publishes this list of the main banks of all listed companies in Korea annually. 
Although a firm can borrow from several banks, the Annual Statistics lists only one bank as the main bank 
that provides the major financing to the firm. We identify each firm’s affiliation with a chaebol using the 
KFTC’s Annual Statistics.  
In Table 1, we present the summary statistics of a sample of 644 firms at the end of fiscal year 1996, 
which comes immediately before the Korean financial crisis. Firm size as measured by total asset (average 
of 610.8 billion won) shows that chaebol firms are substantially larger than non-chaebol firms. The average 
total assets of chaebol firms is five times larger than that of non-chaebol firms. This difference in firm size 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The medians show a similar pattern.  
Leverage, which we measure by the ratio of total debt to total assets, is also significantly different 
between the two groups. The mean leverage ratios for chaebol firms and non-chaebol firms are 77.5 percent 
and 70.6 percent, respectively. For the total sample, the average ratio of bank debt to total assets is 33.4 
percent and the average ratio of bond debt to total assets is 20.7 percent, indicating that in Korea indirect 
financing from banks dominates direct financing from the capital market. The average Korean firm borrows 
about 7.4 percent of total assets from foreign financial institutions and foreign firms.  
Comparing chaebol firms to non-chaebol firms, we find that chaebol firms use more bond and foreign 
debt, but use less bank debt than non-chaebol firms. The average ratio of loans from the main bank to total 
assets for chaebol firm is 4.8 percent with a median of 2.4 percent, and that for non-chaebols is 10.9 percent 
with a median of 5.6 percent. The differences in mean and median ratios between chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms are statistically significant, indicating that non-chaebol firms tend to borrow more from their main 
banks than do chaebol counterparts and that main bank loans are an important source of financing for 
non-chaebol firms.  
In unreported test, we also examine whether the ratios of short-term and long-term debt to total debt are 
different between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. We find that for chaebol firms, these ratios are 38.2 and 
61.8 percent, respectively. For non-chaebol firms, these ratios are 37.8 and 62.2 percent, respectively. The 
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differences in short-term and long-term debt ratios between chaebol and non-chaebol firms are not 
statistically significant. 
The ratios of cash flow to total assets for chaebol and non-chaebol firms are on average 5.5 percent and 
5.2 percent and those of liquid assets to total asset are 5.5 percent and 10.7 percent, respectively. The 
differences in liquidity ratios between chaebol and non-chaebol firms are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
Performance variables measured by market-adjusted cumulative excess returns and Tobin's q are 
significantly higher for non-chaebol firms than chaebol firms. These results indicate that non-chaebol firms 
on average outperform chaebol firms immediately before the financial crisis. The comparison of risk 
variables between chaebol and non-chaebol firms reveals that beta is significantly higher for chaebol firms, 
but that idiosyncratic risk is significantly higher for non-chaebol firms.  
We also note that although the average equity ownership by the largest shareholder is significantly 
higher for non-chaebol firms than chaebol firms (23.5 percent versus 9.0 percent), the mean equity 
ownership by other affiliated firms in the chaebol firms is approximately three times as large as that for 
non-chaebol firms (17.5 percent versus 6.5 percent). These differences in equity ownership by other 
affiliated firms are statistically significant, suggesting that cross-shareholding is more prevalent among 
chaebol firms than among non-chaebol firms. The comparison of the mean controlling ownership (the sum 
of equity ownership by the largest shareholder and equity ownership by other affiliated firms) between 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms shows that it is significantly higher for non-chaebol firms than chaebol 
firms (30.0 percent versus 26.6 percent). 
The average equity ownership by banks is also significantly higher for chaebol firms than it is for 
non-chaebol firms (13.6 percent versus 6.6 percent). We find the similar pattern for the average equity 
ownership by other financial institutions. Equity ownership by foreign investors for the total sample 
averages 4.8 percent. Again, foreign equity investment is larger for chaebol firms (7.2 percent) than 
non-chaebol firms (4.1 percent).  
Finally, the average ratio of exports to sales is 28.2 percent for chaebol firms and 28.3 percent for 
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non-chaebols. These differences are not significant. It is noteworthy that the ratio of exports to sales and the 
ratio of foreign debt to total assets are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.3344, 
indicating that firms that export more tend to borrow more from overseas financial markets or vice versa. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
 
4.1 The effect of external shock on firm value 
 
We use buy-and-hold returns from November 12 to December 28, 1997 to gauge the magnitude of the 
economic shock borne by firms. In other words, we measure the effect of an external shock on firm value by 
computing the holding period return (HPR) from five days (November 12,1997) before the event date (day 
0) to 32 days (December 28, 1997) after the event date. We set November 18, 1997 as an event date on 
which IMF proposed the rescue package to Korea to help the financial crisis that had started with a sharp 
decline of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar in the middle of November 1997. We expect that our 
measurement period is long enough to reflect the effect of the external shock on firm value. During this 
period, there were many negative events about the Korean economy almost everyday, which have an 
adverse effect on the value of the firms. (See the Appendix for the major events from November 1997 to 
December 1997.) The Korean won plunged to the lowest level on December 24, 1997, and several financial 
institutions and firms went bankrupt during our measurement period, causing the effect of adverse shocks to 
be fully incorporated into stock price performance of firms. Thus, this period is likely to be informative 
enough to assess the impact of an external shock on firm value.  
Table 2 summarizes the HPRs of our sample of 644 firms. The mean and median HPRs (-5, 32) are –52.0 
percent and –56.4 percent, respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 level. The subsample 
results show that the mean and median HPRs (-5, 32) for chaebol firms are –47.4 percent and –50.8 percent, 
respectively, and those for non-chaebol firms are –53.3 percent and –58.0 percent, respectively. Tests for 
differences in the mean and median HPRs (-5, 32) between chaebol and non-chaebol firms are strongly 
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rejected at the 0.01 level. The mean and median HPRs for other intervals also show the similar pattern. 
Therefore, our results suggest that chaebol affiliation makes the firm less sensitive to the financial crisis.4 
 
4.2 The determinants of firm value 
 
To understand the cross-sectional variation in firm returns, we present the estimates from multivariate 
regressions. We use the HPR (-5, 32) as the dependent variable and the variables discussed in Section 2 as 
independent variables, which are measured at the end of fiscal year 1996. We also include 4 industry 
dummy variables (construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, and transportation and services) to 
control for a possible industry effect in all regressions. The results are similar if industry effects are not 
controlled.  
Table 3 reports the regression estimates. To conserve space, the table does not report coefficients on the 
industry dummies. The first regression in Table 3 regresses HPR (-5, 32) on firm size, the leverage ratio, 
debt composition variables, a no-guaranteed bond issue dummy variable that takes the value of one if a 
firm’s debt includes public bonds that are not guaranteed by the third party, and a depositary receipt dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm is listed on a foreign stock exchange. Among our sample, 16 
firms are listed on either the New York Stock Exchange or the London Stock Exchange. The results show 
                                            
4 One might argue that the period until June 30, 1998 should be considered as the measurement period for an 
external shock, since the Korean financial crisis triggers the stock market to plunge to the bottom on that date 
recording the lowest point of 286. However, the trend of the Korean Stock Price Index (KOSPI) during the first six 
months of 1998 shows that it increases until March 1998 and then declines after that. This suggests that the period until 
June 30, 1998 is not appropriate to capture the pure effects of an external shock, since the negative effects of an 
external shock that took place in November and December, 1997 are mixed with the positive effects of various 
government policies that took place in early 1998 to help out the firms in financial distress. Nevertheless, we repeat all 
analyses below using the HPR from November 12 to June 30, 1998 as the magnitude of the economic shock borne by 
firms and find results that are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
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that large firms suffer less from the economic shock, indicating that these firms have better ability to 
overcome the adverse shock. The coefficients on the leverage ratio, the ratio of bank loans to total debt, and 
the ratio of bond debt to total debt are significantly negative.5 In contrast, the coefficient on the depositary 
receipt dummy is significant 0.1942 at the 0.01 level. This coefficient suggests that the return of the firm 
whose stock is listed on both the KSE and the foreign stock exchanges is higher than the return of the firm 
whose stock is listed only on the KSE by about 19.42 percent.  It also suggests that the ability of firms to 
access to alternative sources of financing is an important determinant of firm value during the period of the 
economic shock. The ratio of foreign debt to total debt and no guaranteed bond issue dummy variable, 
however, are not significant. Although some have argued that the dramatic devaluation of the Korean 
currency imposed financial difficulties on many firms, our evidence suggests that currency collapses have 
no explanatory power for the change in firm value. 
Overall, our results provide strong support for the argument that the effect of an economic shock on firm 
value is more severe for small firms and/or financially constrained firms with high leverage. However, the 
significant devaluation of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar seems to have little effect on the value of 
the firms.  
In the second regression, we investigate the effect of liquidity by including the ratio of cash flow to total 
assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficients on both 
variables are significant and positive with t-statistics of 4.18 and 3.79, respectively.  
To examine the effect of a firm’s past performance to overcome the economic shock on firm value, in the 
third regression we include the market-adjusted cumulative excess returns during the 1996 period, a 
                                            
5 Alternatively, we investigate the impact of debt composition on firm value by partitioning total debt into 
short-term and long-term debt. We expect that the leverage effect is more pronounced if the firm has a higher fraction 
of short-term debt in its capital structure. This is because firms with more short-term debt tend to experience higher 
probability of the financial distress if they cannot meet their debt obligation in the near future. We find that both 
variables are significant and negative at the 0.01 level. 
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dummy variable that equals one if pre-tax operating income is positive, and Tobin's q. We find that HPRs 
are positively and significantly related to both operating income dummy variable and Tobin’s q. However,  
the coefficient on the past market-adjusted cumulative excess is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Therefore, firms that show good past performance prior to the shock on average experience lower losses in 
the market value of their equity during the period of economic shock.  
The fourth regression examines the relation between the risk and firm value by including beta and 
market model residual variance. The coefficients on these two variables are negative and significant at the 
0.01 level, supporting the hypothesis that firms with high exposure to economic activity and firms with high 
idiosyncratic risk suffer more from the adverse shock.   
In the fifth regression, we include all variables considered in the previous regression. To examine more 
closely the effect of bank loans on firm value, we bifurcate the bank loan ratio into the fraction of the debt 
from the firm’s main bank to total assets and the fraction of the debt from other banks to total assets. We also 
consider as explanatory variables a chaebol dummy variable, equity ownership by controlling shareholder, 
banks, other financial institutions, other unaffiliated firms, and foreigners, and the ratio of exports to sales. 
To gain further insight into the role of controlling ownership in a chaebol, we also add an interaction term 
between the equity ownership by controlling shareholder and the chaebol dummy.  
The results show that most of the variables that were significant in the previous regression are also 
significant except for the operating income dummy and the market model residual variance. We also find 
that the ratio of loans from the main bank to total debt is significantly negative, but the ratio of loans from 
other banks to total debt is not significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on the ratio of loans from the main 
bank to total debt is statistically different from the ratio of loans from other banks to total debt, indicating 
that main bank debt is a more important variable than other bank debt in explaining the firms’ HPRs.  
Among ownership variables, equity ownership by banks is significantly and negatively related to the 
change in firm value. The fact that both the ratio of bank loans to total debt and equity ownership by banks 
are significantly negative implies that close ties with banks before the shock adversely affect the value of 
client firms. These results support the view that when a bank experiences the shock and suffers from a 
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decreased ability to lend to a borrower, the client firm is adversely affected.6 The negative coefficient on the 
bank loan ratio is consistent with that of Kang and Stulz (2000), who show that Japanese firms that were 
more dependent on banks than those that were less bank dependent had worse performance during the early 
1990s when banks experienced severe adverse shocks. In contrast, equity ownership by other financial 
institutions and equity ownership by foreigners are significantly and positively related to the HPR, 
indicating that the high presence of these types of investors is greeted less negatively by the stock market. 
The other ownership variables including equity ownership by controlling shareholder and equity ownership 
by other unaffiliated firms, however, are not significant. The coefficients on the chaebol dummy and the 
interaction term between the equity ownership by controlling shareholder and the chaebol dummy are also 
not significant. Thus, after controlling for firm-specific characteristics, chaebol affiliation does not have 
any statistically discernible effect on firm value. 
Finally, the coefficient on the ratio of exports to sales is positive and significant at the 0.10 level. To the 
extent that firms export more have better access to the foreign currency, this result support the view that 
high exports help firms overcome the financial crisis that is accompanied by sharp devaluation of the 
currency. We note that the adjusted R-square of the regression is 29 percent, suggesting that the regression 
model fits the data well. 
In sum, firms that are small and risky, have high leverage ratio, and have low cash flow and low liquidity 
realize a larger drop in the value of their equity when there is a shock in the economy. Firms that depend 
more on bank financing, particularly main bank financing, also suffer more from the economic shock. In 
contrast, firms that have alternative means of financing, export more, and are largely owned by other 
financial institutions and foreign investors experience a lower drop. 
                                            
6 We also investigate the result on the no-guaranteed bond issue dummy variable by replacing it with the bond 
issue dummy variable that equals one if the main bank guarantees the bond issue. The result indicates that the 
coefficient on this variable is significantly negative, suggesting that firms with close relationship with the main bank 
suffer a greater loss in their share values when the economy is weak.   
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4.3 Restructuring activities  
 
Firms can respond to a shock either internally or externally. In this section, we examine various kinds of 
corporate restructuring activities that our sample firms engage in, in response to the shock during the period 
between November 1997 and December 1998. Following Kang and Shivdasani (1997), we classify the 
actions that the firms take into seven categories: Asset downsizing, employment changes, expansion, 
internal reorganization, changes in control, external takeover, and other restructuring activities such as 
changes in company names and accounting methods. Data on reported actions are obtained from Chosun 
Daily and Korean Economic Daily. 
Our sample of 644 firms announces a total of 1,435 restructuring activities from November 1997 to 
December 1998. Many firms are involved in more than one restructuring, so the number of firms engaged in 
restructuring is 338 (52.5% of the total sample). In comparison, Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) report that for a 
sample of 137 Korean firms that experienced a decline of at least 50% in their operating income in a given 
year between 1989 and 1996, 78 firms (56.9% of the total sample) implement some form of restructuring 
actions. Thus, the 1997-1998 crisis causes the Korean firms to take restructuring actions as frequently as 
when there was a substantial decline in operating performance of an individual firm. A breakdown of the 
restructuring actions by industry shows that most of the restructuring actions take place in manufacturing 
(266 out of 520 firms), followed by services (45 out of 65 firms), construction (33 out of 52 firms), and 
fisheries and mining (3 out of 7 firms).  
Table 4 shows restructuring activities of our sample firms. The second column shows the number of total 
firms engaged in restructuring activities and the ratio of this number to the total sample of 644 firms. The 
third and fourth columns report the numbers of chaebol and non-chaebol firms engaged in restructuring 
activities and the ratios of these numbers to the total sample of 148 chaebol firms and 496 non-chaebol 
firms, respectively. Of the various restructuring activities, asset downsizing occurs most frequently. Asset 
downsizing includes the sale of assets, investment cut, plant closures, and product or line withdrawals. Of 
the 644 firms in the sample, 273 firms (42.4 percent) engage in asset-downsizing actions. For a sample of 
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92 Japanese and 114 U.S. firms from 1986 to 1990 that experienced a decline of at least 50% in their 
operating income in a given year, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) show that 21 Japanese firms (22.8 percent) 
and 56 U.S. firms (49.1 percent) engage in some form of asset downsizing actions. Ofek (1993) finds 23 
percent of his U.S. sample firms announce asset restructuring during the distress year, and Denis and Kruse 
(2000) show that 44 percent of their U.S. sample firms that experience performance declines undertake 
asset restructuring in the year of the performance decline and the following year. The corresponding 
number for Korean firms in the Kang, Lee, and Na sample is 21.2 percent. Thus, Korean firms experiencing 
the economic crisis are approximately twice as likely to engage in asset contraction policies compared to 
Japanese and Korean firms experiencing performance shocks and appear to engage in asset contraction 
policies with slightly lower frequencies than U.S. firms do.  
Of the various responses indicating asset downsizing, the sale of assets is the most frequently observed 
response (181 firms, 28.1 percent), followed by investment cut (9 firms), plant closures (8 firms), and 
withdrawal from a line of business (5 firms). Seventy firms (10.9 percent) also engage in multiple asset 
downsizing actions. Of these, 56 firms (8.7 percent) respond by asset sales and other asset downsizing 
actions. Adding these 56 firms to 181 firms that conduct asset sales only, 237 firms (36.8 percent) in our 
sample respond by asset sales. In comparison, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find 4.3 percent of their 
Japanese sample firms involved in asset sale. The corresponding numbers in the Denis and Kruse sample 
and the Kang, Lee, and Na sample are 28 percent and 17.5 percent, respectively. The higher frequency of 
the asset sale in our sample suggests that the economic shock induces firms to choose the restructuring 
mode, which can provide the immediate liquidity for firms’ survival. 
Comparison of chaebol and non-chaebol firms shows 126 chaebol firms (19.6 percent) and 147 
non-chaebol firms (22.8 percent) conducting some form of asset downsizing activities. Since the total 
number of firms belonging to chaebols (non-chaebols) is 148 (496), this number suggests that 85.2 (29.6) 
percent of total chaebol (non-chaebol) firms implement asset downsizing activities. Thus, there is a 
significantly higher level of asset contraction in chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms. 
Our sample firms also undertake changes in employment policies including layoffs and reduction in 
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salary or bonuses as a downsizing measure. Thirty-two firms lay off employees, 23 firms reduce salaries or 
bonuses of their employees, and 25 firms implement both. All together, 80 firms (12.4 percent) change their 
employment and compensation policies.  It is noteworthy that 85 percent of these 80 firms belong to 
chaebols, indicating chaebol firms are more likely to utilize changes in employment policies when they 
experience difficulties. In comparison, Ofek (1993) and Denis and Kruse (2000) document an 
employee-layoff occurrence rate of 28 percent and 20 percent for samples of poorly performing U.S. firms, 
respectively, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find a 28.3 percent for poorly performing Japanese firms, while 
Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) report a 4.4 percent employee-layoff rate for poorly performing Korean firms. 
Thus, Korean firms experiencing the economic crisis appear to display an abnormally high frequency of 
employee layoffs compared to those experiencing short-term performance shocks, but show a low 
frequency compared to firms in the U.S. and Japan. 
Although many firms undertake downsizing actions to overcome the economic shock, some firms also 
respond by expanding the scale or scope of their operations. Such activities include joint venture and 
strategic alliance, mergers and acquisitions, construction of new facility or adding new line of business, 
increased output, expansion of existing production facilities, and increased R & D. Out of 644 firms, 107 
firms (66 chaebol and 41 non-chaebol firms), which represent 16.6 percent of the total sample, announce 
some form of expansionary actions. Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) for comparison, document that 59.9 percent 
of their Korean sample firms undertake expansionary actions, and Kang and Shivdasani (1997) show that 
76.1 percent of their Japanese sample firms and 55.3 percent of their U.S. sample firms engage in some 
form of expansionary actions. Thus, unlike performance shocks, the frequency of overall expansionary 
actions under the economic shock appears to be particularly low. The fact that 61.7 percent of 107 firms that 
expand their operations belong to chaebols indicates that owner-managers of the chaebol have strong 
incentives to maximize the overall size of their chaebol even during the economic crisis. In many cases, 
firms that engage in expansionary actions also undertake downsizing actions. Of the 107 (66 chaebol) firms 
that engage in some form of expansion, 85 (60 chaebol) firms also respond by either downsizing assets or 
changing employment policies.  The number of total firms (chaebol firms) that downsize by either an asset 
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contraction or the change in employment policy without expansion is 165 (56). 
Firms also respond by taking actions to reorganize their operations. Actions in this category include 
strengthening the core businesses, reorganizing subsidiaries or units, and changing organizational 
structures, etc. Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1999) document that refocusing-related 
corporate reorganizations create economically significant enhancements of value to shareholders of 
diversified firms. Furthermore, these value enhancements are positively related to the amounts of value that 
were being destroyed by diversification. A total of 136 (90 chaebol) firms, 21.1 (14.0) percent of the total 
sample, implement internal reorganizations, and of these, 116 (83 chaebol) firms adopt policies related to 
strengthening firm's core businesses. 
We also find that firms respond with significant changes in internal control mechanisms such as 
turnover of top management (CEO or president), introduction or expansion of outside board of directors 
system, removal of a central staff within the group, and establishing independent board of directors system 
for each group firm. Weisbach (1988) and Denis and Denis (1995) find that top management turnover in the 
U.S. has a significant and positive effect on firm value. Weisbach (1988) also shows that during 
performance decline firms with the board controlled by outside directors are more likely to replace the CEO 
than those with the board controlled by inside director. In the sample, 94 firms, of which 93 belong to the 
chaebols, mention efforts to change internal control mechanisms. Of these, 16 firms that represent 2.5 
percent of the total sample experience a change in the top management, and 37 firms introduce or expand 
outside board of directors system. For comparison, John, Lang, and Netter (1992) find a 12.5 percent annual 
CEO turnover rate for poorly performing U.S. firms, and Kang and Shivdasani (1997) document a 
president/CEO turnover rate of 47.3 percent for their Japanese sample firms and 27.2 percent for their U.S. 
sample firms over the two year interval, while Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) find a 21.9 percent president/CEO 
turnover rate for their Korean sample firms. Thus, the level of overall turnover activity in our sample 
appears to be particularly low.  
Separating 16 total turnover events into routine (planned retirements) and nonroutine, we find that 6 (0.9 
percent) firms experience a change in top management in routine way and the remaining 10 (1.6 percent) 
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firms in nonroutine way. In contrast, Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) show that 13.9 percent of their Korean 
sample firms experience nonroutine turnover. These results are basically consistent with those of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) who show that the board is reluctant to replace top managers when the whole 
industry is suffering. Finally, 26 chaebol firms respond by removing a central staff within the group or 
establishing independent board of directors system for each group firm.  
Some firms are taken over by other firms. Thirty firms (4.9 percent) are acquired via a merger, of which 
15 are chaebol firms and the remaining 15 are non-chaebol firms. Nineteen firms are taken over by 
affiliated firms and 11 by non-affiliated firms. The frequency of external control activities in our sample is 
abnormally lower than those reported by Denis and Kruse (2000) for U.S. firms, and is slightly lower than 
that by Kang, Lee, and Na (2001) for Korean firms. Our sample firms also undertake a number of other 
actions, such as changing accounting methods, issuing foreign private bonds, and changing company names, 
etc. There are 61 such firms in our sample.  
Overall, compared to the firms that experience a substantial decline in operating performance under a 
normal economic condition, our sample firms are more likely to engage in downsizing actions and are less 
likely to undertake expansionary actions. These results suggest that the frequency of a particular type of 
corporate restructuring being undertaken differs substantially between the economic and performance 
shock periods. Given that the immediate survival is a main concern of Korean firms during the 1997-1998 
period, our results are consistent with the view that firms experiencing economic difficulties are more likely 
to rely on the restructuring type that can improve their liquidity position within a relatively short-time 
period.  In contrast, firms that experience performance declines appear more likely to adopt the policy of 
top management turnover, possibly blaming the management team for their poor performance.  
 
4.4 The likelihood of restructuring 
 
In this section we examine the effect of several factors on the likelihood of restructuring activities. We 
perform multivariate logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is set to one if a particular 
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restructuring occurs and zero otherwise. Independent variables are measured at the fiscal year-end that 
comes immediately before the restructuring announcements.  
The first regression in Panel A of Table 5 examines the factors that influence the likelihood of a firm 
engaging in either a contraction of its assets or an employment change. Since the regression results 
discussed in section 4.2 show that size, leverage and liquidity are important determinants of the change in 
firm value, we include as explanatory variables the logarithm of total assets, the ratio of total debt to total 
assets, the ratio of cash flow to total assets, and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. The coefficient on 
firm size is significant and positive at the 0.01 level and the coefficient on the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets is significant and negative at the 0.01 level, indicating that large firms and financially constrained 
firms are more likely to engage in asset downsizing or employee layoffs. We find that firm size is also 
significant and positive in other regressions of Table 5 except for expansionary actions without downsizing 
and external takeover activities. These results indicate that large firms are more likely to restructure when 
they experience the crisis, reflecting the fact that restructuring actions are a function of capital and human 
resources held by firms. 
To further estimate the effect of firm characteristics on the likelihood of downsizing actions, the second 
regression includes all variables in Table 3 as independent variables. We also consider as an independent 
variable the HPR (-5, 32) to measure the magnitude of the economic shock borne by firms. We include this 
variable to see whether downsizing activities are related to the extent to which firms suffer from the 
external shock. If the magnitude of the stock price effect for firms reflects ability to withstand exogenous 
shocks, we would expect a negative relation between the frequency of downsizing actions and the HPR (-5. 
32). The results show that the coefficient on the HPR (-5, 32) is significant and negative at the 0.01 level. 
This result implies that the larger the shock borne by firms, the higher the likelihood that they downsize 
their assets or operations. However, the coefficient on the ratio of liquid assets to total assets loses its 
significance. We attribute the insignificance of the coefficient on the liquidity ratio to its positive 
correlation with the HPR (-5, 32). The correlation between the two variables is 0.12 with a p-value of 0.00. 
Alternatively, the HPR (-5, 32) is likely to be more informative than the accounting measure of the liquidity 
 24 
ratio since the accounting measure is backward-looking, while the HPR is forward-looking. Thus, the HPR 
might serve as a better proxy for the financial condition of the firms. 
There is a significant and positive relation between asset downsizing and the ratio of bank loans to total 
debt. However, the total leverage ratio and the ratio of foreign debt to total assets are not significant. These 
results suggest that the composition of debt matters for corporate restructuring and that firms are more 
likely to engage in downsizing actions when their banks hold a significant debt claim. Given that a 
substantial portion of debt claim in Korean firms is usually held by a few banks, our results support the view 
that large debtholders have strong incentives to monitor the firm. The importance of bank debt in corporate 
restructuring is consistent with the results by Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) who show that U.S. firms with 
large bank borrowings are more likely to restructure their debt.  
In unreported tests, we also estimate the effect of total leverage by separating it into short-term and 
long-term debt. We find that the extent of short-term borrowings is positively and significantly associated 
with asset downsizing, but that long-term debt has little statistically discernible effect on asset downsizing. 
Therefore, during the period of an economy shock short-term debtholders perform a critical role by 
increasing the likelihood of asset contractions, possibly entailing their worries about the ability of the firm 
to generate operating cash flow. Our results are different from those of Ofek (1993) who finds a positive 
and significant relation between long- and short-term leverage and the probability of operational actions.   
Downsizing is more likely when equity ownership by other financial institutions, equity ownership by 
other non-affiliated firms, and equity ownership by foreign investors are high. Thus, shareholders who are 
less likely to be influenced by managers are more likely to take actions that reduce the scale of firms’ 
operations.  
Downsizing likelihood also increases with the membership to the chaebol. However, we find that the 
effect of two interaction terms, the interaction term between the chaebol dummy and the controlling 
ownership and the interaction term between the chaebol dummy and leverage ratio, is negative and 
significant at the 0.1 level. These results indicate that chaebol firms with either high ownership by 
controlling shareholders or high leverage are less likely to downsize. The fact that the coefficients on these 
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two interaction terms are negative and the coefficient on the chaebol dummy is positive suggest that during 
the economic crisis the distribution of equity ownership and debt claims in chaebol firms play an important 
role in downsizing process. One possible explanation for the negative coefficient on the interaction term 
between the chaebol dummy and leverage ratio is that most debt in chaebols is guaranteed by the cross-debt 
guarantees among their member firms. This provides debtholders with less incentive to monitor the firm 
(Kang, 1998). The cross-debt guarantee ratio (the amount of debt guarantee over book equity) as of 1997 
averages 108 percent for the top 30 chaebols. Alternatively, government or financial institutions provide the 
implicit guarantee of a bailout for chaebol firms with high leverage since these firms are simply too big to 
fail. This implicit guarantee gives rise to an agency problem that leads to overinvestment and makes firms 
reluctant to restructure. It is also possible that the concentrated ownership by owner-managers and an 
internal capital market within the chaebol insulate the chaebol owner-managers from disciplinary forces of 
debt and thus leave them unconstrained.7  
The third and fourth regressions examine the factors that influence the probability of a firm expanding its 
operations in response to the economic shock. The most striking results are that the interaction term 
between the chaebol dummy and the controlling ownership and the interaction term between the chaebol 
dummy and leverage ratio are significant and positive at the 0.10 level. These results corroborate those in 
the second regression in that chaebol owner-managers whose firms are characterized by either concentrated 
equity ownership or high leverage have strong incentives to maximize the size and scope of their chaebol 
even during unfavorable economic condition. The coefficients on firm size, the depositary receipt dummy, 
and equity ownership by other unaffiliated firms are also positive and significant, suggesting that relatively 
well established firms with better access to external financing are more likely to implement expansionary 
                                            
7 We also estimate the third regression by adding a dummy variable for corporate bond issues that are not 
guaranteed by the third party. We find that the coefficient on this dummy variable is negative and significant, 
suggesting that firms that have better access to capital markets are less likely to sell their assets or to layoff their 
employees. For the sake of brevity, this result is not reported. 
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activities. In contrast, the coefficient on equity ownership by banks is negative and significant. Thus, firms 
are less likely to expand when banks hold a significant equity stake.   
To further examine the expansionary actions firms undertake, in the fifth and sixth regressions we 
consider only the subset of firms that expand but do not downsize. We find that chaebol firms on average 
are less likely to expand, but those with high leverage are more likely to expand.  
In summary, the analysis of downsizing and expansionary actions indicates that the probability of 
downsizing actions increases when firms suffer severely from the external shock, when independent 
outside investors who are less likely to be influenced by managers hold large equity claims or when banks 
hold large debt claims. In contrast, chaebol firms with high leverage or those with concentrated equity 
ownership by controlling shareholders frequently respond to the economic shock by expanding (or less 
downsizing) their operations, possibly due to either their strong capability to obtain external financing or 
the distorted incentives of owner-managers to maximize the size of the group. In the next section we 
examine these two conflicting explanations in more detail by estimating the valuation effects of downsizing 
and expansionary announcements.  
The remaining regressions in Panel B of Table 5 report the relation between firm characteristics and the 
likelihood of restructuring measures other than downsizing and expansion. We briefly discuss the main 
results of these regressions below. 
We find that internal reorganization is more likely to occur in large firms, those belonging to the chaebol, 
those with high beta, and those that suffer more from the economic shock, but is less likely to occur in firms 
that are listed on foreign stock exchanges and those with large equity ownership by banks (seventh 
regression). Our finding that the firm whose stock is listed on a foreign stock exchange is less likely to 
engage in internal reorganization may reflect the fact that this firm has already streamlined its internal 
organization as a preparatory step for the listing in the foreign stock exchange.  
For chaebol firms, the probability of changes in internal control is positively related to firm size, 
leverage, beta, equity ownership by other financial institutions, and equity ownership by non-affiliated 
firms (eighth regression) and the likelihood of top management turnover is positively related to firm size, 
 27 
equity ownership by non-affiliated firms, and equity ownership by foreign investors (ninth regression).8 
Thus, shareholders who are independent of the management play an important role in the process of 
changes in control rights and top management turnover.  
Finally, we find that the probability of firms being taken over by other firms is positively related to the 
ratio of foreign debt to total debt and equity ownership by non-affiliated firms, but is negatively related to 
leverage, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and equity ownerships by controlling shareholders and 
banks (tenth regression).  
 
4.5 The valuation effects of restructuring events and changes in long-term performance 
 
The previous studies show that restructuring activities caused by performance shocks lead to an increase 
in firm value (Jain, 1985; Denis and Kruse, 2000) and an improvement in the operating performance (John 
and Ofek, 1995; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997; Denis and Kruse, 2000; Kang, Lee, and Na, 2001).  In this 
section we examine the valuation effects of restructuring announcements and the effect of downsizing and 
expansionary actions on long-term operating performance of our sample firms over two years following 
these actions. Restructuring announcements in response to a negative external shock could be 
value-enhancing events and thus result in the improvement in future operating performance if firms sell 
unprofitable assets or operations, reduce labor expenses, or strengthen a firm's strategic position by 
focusing on the core businesses. In contrast, if firms take excessive risks to expand their business into 
several different industries, such expansionary actions could be detrimental to shareholders. For example, 
Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Berger and Ofek (1995) show that diversification 
activities of U.S. firms adversely impact firm value, and Lins and Servaes (1999) document that 
diversification is also detrimental to firm value in Japan.  
                                            
8 Since most of the changes in internal governance and changes in top management occurred in chaebol firms, the 
chaebol dummy is not included in the analysis. 
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4.5.1 The valuation effect of restructuring events 
To assess the valuation effect of restructuring events, we use a standard event-study approach. We 
identify the initial public announcement date of the restructuring activities of firms from two daily 
newspapers, Chosun Daily and Korean Economic Daily. We use as the announcement date the date that a 
news announcement first appeared in either of these two publications. To avoid having results confounded 
by multiple events that cluster during a short time period, we eliminate those events that occur within five 
calendar days after the first event.  
For each event, we compute the abnormal return (AR) by estimating the market model. We use the 
KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) return as the benchmark. We obtain our estimates of the 
market model by using 200 trading days of return data, beginning 220 days before, and ending 20 days 
before, the restructuring announcement. We sum the daily abnormal returns to get the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) from day t  before the restructuring announcement date to day t  after the restructuring 
announcement date. We use the t-statistic to test the hypothesis that the average CARs are equal to zero and 
the sign-rank test statistic to test the hypothesis that the CARs are distributed symmetrically around zero. 
1 2
Table 6 shows the CARs(-5, 5) for various restructuring activities. We note that there have been daily 
price limits in the KSE during our sample period. For example, before March, 1998, the price limit was set 
at 8 percent for all stocks and from March, 1998 to November, 1998, it was set at 12 percent. These price 
limit rules suggest that investors might have continued to react even after the restructuring announcement, 
which requires us to use a longer event window for the return analysis.9 Therefore, in the subsequent 
analysis, we focus on CAR(-5, 5) rather than CAR(-1, 0). We also experiment with CAR(-1, 0) and find that 
our results do not change when we use this event window. 
We find that when a firm announces restructuring activities, its stock price on average increases except 
                                            
9 Bae, Kang, and Kim (2001) show that their sample of 107 Korean bidders during the 1981-1997 period 
experience an unusually high frequency of limits around the merger announcement days and use a longer event 
window, day-5 to day 5, for their return analysis.  
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for diversified expansionary actions.  The mean and median CAR(-5, 5) for firms that announce downsizing 
actions (either asset downsizing or employment changes) are 2.47 percent and 0.55 percent, respectively, 
and are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. When we separate the sample into chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms, we find that the mean CAR for chaebol firms is 2.60 percent with a median of -1.31 percent. The 
mean CAR is significant at the 0.05 level. The corresponding numbers for non-chaebol firms are 2.26 
percent and 4.47 percent, respectively, and of which the median CAR is significant at the 0.01 level. The 
median difference in CARs between chaebol and non-chaebol firms is statistically significant at the 0.10 
level.   
However, these positive gains in downsizing actions are mainly from asset sales by chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms. We find that chaebol (non-chaebol) firms that announce asset sales realize the mean 
return of 6.28 (2.08) percent with a median of 1.16 (4.37) percent. In contrast, other downsizing actions do 
not display any positive announcement effects. In fact, the magnitude of the announcement returns for asset 
sales is the largest among seven restructuring modes we examine in this study except for external takeover 
activities. In comparison, Denis and Kruse (2000) document a statistically significant 1.75 (0.68) percent 
two-day mean (median) return for their U.S. sample firms that announce asset sales in response to 
performance shocks. Thus, the announcement effects of asset sales documented in our study are larger in 
magnitude than those in U.S. firms experiencing performance shocks. Given that most of the Korean firms 
suffer severely from the liquidity constrains during our sample period, our results suggest that the stock 
market reacts more favorably particularly when firms take an action that relax their liquidity constraints.  
The announcement effect for expansion policies shows that the mean (median) CAR(-5, 5) is 0.33 (0.31) 
percent for the total sample, which is not statistically significant. However, when we split the sample into 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms, non-chaebol firms realize a positive mean CAR of 5.53 percent with a 
median of 3.54 percent, both of which are significant at the 0.05 level, but chaebol firms show an 
insignificant mean (median) return of –1.42 (–1.12) percent. The mean and median tests of differences 
between the two groups are significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Given that non-chaebol 
firms tend to be smaller in size and have less alternative means of financing than chaebol firms do, the 
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managers of the non-chaebol firm are more likely to undertake expansionary actions when those actions 
create value. Therefore, expansionary actions undertaken by a non-chaebol firm could provide the signal to 
the market that these actions are value-enhancing events. In contrast, the same actions by chaebol firms are 
greeted negatively by investors since chaebol’s owner-managers sometimes pursue private objectives 
during expansionary investments at the expense of other shareholder wealth (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2001). 
Alternatively, non-chaebol firms might rise in value because the market perceives that their overinvestment 
problem caused by debt financing is less severe than chaebol firms. To examine this possibility, we divide 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms into four subgroups according to the median of their leverage ratios. We 
find that the mean and median CARs for non-chaebol firms with high leverage are 5.4 percent and 5.3 
percent, respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 level. The corresponding mean and median 
returns for chaebol firms are –2.61 percent and –0.18 percent, respectively, and are not significant. The tests 
of mean and median differences between these two groups strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality. 
However, the mean and median returns for the other subsamples of chaebol and non-chaebol firms that 
have low leverage and the differences in their returns are not significant.  
To further explore the circumstance under which expansionary policies are more detrimental, we 
examine a subsample of 31 firms that undertake diversifying expansionary actions. The mean and median 
CARs of diversifying actions by chaebol firms are –15.99 percent and –7.02 percent, respectively, which 
are significant at the 0.05 level. The diversifying actions by non-chaebol firms, however, do not show any 
significant, negative CARs, indicating that the managerial objectives of diversifying expansion in chaebol 
firms are clearly different from those in non-chaebol firms. Tests of differences in mean and median CARs 
across these two groups reject the null hypothesis that they are equal. In unreported tests, we examine 
further the potential difference in managerial incentives between chaebol and non-chaebol firms by 
stratifying a sample of 31 diversifying firms into four subgroups according to chaebol affiliation and the 
median of controlling ownership. We find that only chaebol firms with high controlling ownership 
experience significant and negative CARs. The mean and median CARs for these firms are –27.58 percent 
and –16.50 percent, respectively, which are significant at the 0.01 level. For non-chaebol firms with high 
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controlling ownership, the corresponding CARs are –5.36 percent and –2.37 percent, which are not 
significant. The mean and median tests of differences between the two groups are significant at 0.10 and 
0.05 levels, respectively. The results for these chaebol firms are different from those of Lewellen, Loderer, 
and Rosenfeld (1989) who show that the announcement returns for U.S. firms engaged in diversifying 
mergers are positively related to managerial ownership. Our results suggest that the diversification motive 
of chaebol owner-managers who have a significant control over the firm has a detrimental effect on firm 
value. 
As an alternative test, we examine the returns for a subsample 22 firms that announce expansionary 
actions without engaging in downsizing. The CARs for these actions made by a sample of five firms 
belonging to a chaebol are insignificant and negative (mean –2.22 percent and median –1.98 percent) and 
those by 16 non-chaebol firms are insignificant and positive (mean 4.26 percent and median 2.01 percent). 
Although the differences in CARs between chaebol and non-chaebol firms seem to be economically large, 
they are not statistically significant, possibly due to the small sample size.  
Consistent with the findings of Berger and Ofek (1999) who examine the valuation effect of 
refocusing-related announcements by U.S. firms, we find that firms’ actions to reorganize their operations 
lead to a positive and significant return. For the total sample, we obtain a significant and positive average 
CAR of 3.47 percent with a median of 1.33 percent. The average CARs for chaebol and non-chaebol firms 
are 3.74 percent and 2.66 percent, respectively, but only the CAR for chaebol firms shows a statistical 
significance. 
Changes in control rights, all of which are undertaken by chaebol firms, however, have little statistically 
discernible effect on firm value. The mean and median CARs are –1.47 percent and –1.41 percent, both of 
which are not significant. We explore the importance of changes in control rights further by examining our 
results for a subsample of 16 chaebol firms that announce top management turnover. The average (median) 
CAR for this subsample is 3.17 (2.26) percent and is not statistically significant, again possibly due to the 
small sample size. 
Finally, we find that external takeover activities are associated with a positive announcement effect. The 
 32 
average (median) CAR for a subsample of 30 firms that are taken over by other firms is 8.71 (6.00) percent 
and is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
Overall, our results suggest that the announcement effects of restructuring events undertaken by chaebol 
firms are positive and significant for downsizing and internal reorganization actions, but are negative and 
significant for diversifying expansionary actions. These results indicate that the chaebol firm’s policies that 
contract its operations or refocus on its core businesses are more likely to be perceived positively by 
investors than the policies that expand its businesses. The returns for non-chaebol firms are also positive 
and significant when they announce downsizing actions, but are non-negative and sometimes significantly 
positive when they announce expansionary actions. In sum, our results suggest that chaebol 
owner-managers have different objectives from their non-chaebol counterparts when they restructure their 
firms, and that the stock market clearly differentiates these differences in managerial incentives.  
 
4.5.2 Changes in long-term performance 
To examine the long-term performance of restructuring actions triggered by an economic shock, we 
estimate industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to total assets for the two years following the 
restructuring announcements. Given that many of our sample firms undertake multiple restructuring 
activities during the 1997-1998 period, the inclusion of all sample firms in the analysis would result in the 
contamination of the long-term performance. To avoid this problem, we focus on only two subgroups of 
firms: downsizing actions without expansion and expansionary actions without downsizing.  
Table 7 reports the results for the changes in operating performance. For a total sample of 157 firms that 
downsize without expansion, the average industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to total assets is 
significant and negative in restructuring announcement year (year 0), and significant and positive in years 1 
and 2. The median industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to total assets is also positive and significant 
in year 2. This improvement in operating performance is most evident for chaebol firms. These firms 
experience a mean (median) of 2.23 (3.07) percent increase in performance in year 2, which is significant at 
the 0.05 (0.10) level. In contrast, the mean and median industry-adjusted operating performance for 
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non-chaebol firms in years 1 and 2 are not significant.  
For a total sample of 22 firms that expand without downsizing, the mean and median industry-adjusted 
operating performance are also significant and positive in year 1, but this improvement in performance is 
mainly detected in non-chaebol firms (mean 1.73 percent and median 1.00 percent). The mean and median 
changes in operating performance over the subsequent two years are not significant for the total sample and 
the subsamples of chaebol and non-chaebol firms. It is noteworthy that chaebol firms that expand without 
downsizing on average underperform their industry peers by 8.09 percent and non-chaebol firms by 7.66 
percent in year 0, both of which are significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. Thus, poorly 
performing chaebol firms are more likely to engage in expansionary actions during the shock period. Our 
results for operating improvements in downsizing actions are consistent with those of Kang and Shivdasani 
(1997), Denis and Kruse (2000), and Kang, Lee, and Na (2001).  
In unreported tests, we also examine industry-adjusted excess returns following the restructuring 
announcements. Over the two years following the restructuring announcements, the average (median) 
industry-adjusted cumulative abnormal return is 23.52 (11.15) percent for firms engaging in downsizing 
actions and 9.59 (–6.11) percent for firms engaging in expansionary action. The mean and median returns 
for firms engaging in downsizing actions are significant at the 0.01 level. Separating the sample into 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms, we find that the stock-market performance on average improves by 39.6 
percent (median 40.44 percent) for chaebol firms and 15.25 percent (median –0.29 percent) for non-chaebol 
firms. The mean returns are significant for both chaebol and non-chaebol firms, but the median returns are 
significant only for chaebol firms. The differences in mean and median returns between chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms are statistically significant at the 0.10 level. These results suggest that downsizing 
actions by chaebol firms are more favorably viewed by investors than those by non-chaebol firms. However, 
we find that expansionary actions do not improve long-term stock-market performance for both chaebol 
and non-chaebol firms. 
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5. Summary and conclusion 
 
In this paper we examine the impact of an economic shock on firm value and restructurings. We find 
that the 1997 financial crisis of Korea has a significant and negative effect on firm value. This adverse 
effect on firm value is an increasing function of leverage, close ties to the bank, and exposure to economic 
activity (beta), but is a decreasing function of firm size, liquidity, past performance, and equity ownership 
by unaffiliated investors. We also find that firms that have alternative means of access to capital markets 
and those that have high ratio of exports to sales suffer less from the economic shock.  The fact that there is 
systematic evidence on the extent to which firm value is related to several firm-specific characteristics 
suggests that these characteristics play an important role in determining the organizational efficiency of the 
firm when the economy encounters difficulties.  
Korean firms implement several restructuring measures, such as downsizing, expansion, and internal 
reorganization, in response to the economic shock. Unlike firms that experience a substantial decline in 
operating performance, our sample firms respond more frequently by selling assets and through employee 
layoffs rather than engaging in expansion. These results are consistent with the view that the economic 
crisis causes firms to choose the restructuring mode that can provide immediate liquidity needed for their 
survival.  
The likelihood of downsizing actions increases with the magnitude of the economic shock borne by 
firms, the ratio of bank loans to total debt, ownership by other non-affiliated investors, and firm size. 
Chaebol affiliation also increases the likelihood of downsizing actions. However, chaebol firms with either 
concentrated ownership by owner-managers or high leverage are less likely to downsize than are other 
firms. In contrast, the probability of firms undertaking expansionary actions is positively related to 
ownership by owner-managers or leverage of chaebol firms. Our results suggest that the chaebol firms 
whose controlling shareholders have concentrated equity ownership or those that maintain high leverage 
have a strong incentive to maximize the size and scope of the firm even during the crisis period.  
We also find that chaebol firms that engage in downsizing actions realize a positive and significant 
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announcement return, but those that announce diversifying expansionary actions realize a significant 
negative return. In contrast, non-chaebol firms that announce diversifying expansionary actions experience 
an insignificant positive return. Finally, we find improvement in operating performance following 
downsizing actions by chaebol firms.  
Overall, our results suggest that firm value and the nature of the restructuring process in Korea during 
the economic crisis are a function of several firm-specific variables, and that manager and owner incentives 
play a critical role in this process. Unlike in the U.S., where managers are subject to disciplinary pressures 
from the capital markets, disciplinary pressures are generally lacking in Korea. Under these circumstances, 
empire-building chaebol managers have strong incentives to maximize either their own utility or the overall 
size of the chaebol rather than individual firm value even during the economic crisis. Different restructuring 
behaviors documented in this paper between chaebol and non-chaebol firms seem to be largely attributable 
to these distorted incentives of chaebol owner-managers.  
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Table 1   
Descriptive statistics of firm characteristics. 
 
The sample includes 644 nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) between November 1997 and 
December 1998. Bank loan data are obtained from a firm’s annual audit report and other financial data are from the Listed 
Company Database of the Korean Listed Companies Association. The stock price data are from the daily return files of the Korea 
Investors Service-Stock Market Analysis Tool and Stock Database of the Korea Stock Research Institute. The summary statistics 
are the values at the end of fiscal year 1996 except for market-adjusted cumulative excess return, beta, and market model residual 
variance. Beta is estimated by the slope of the market model regression, using one- year daily returns during 1996. Equity 
ownership by other financial institutions includes equity ownership by financial institutions excluding banks and securities 
companies. Chaebol firms are those that belong to one of the 30 largest business groups in Korea. Numbers in brackets denote the 
medians.  
By chaebol affiliation 
Test of difference (p-value)  
Number of  
sample 
(N=644) 
Chaebol firms 
(N=148) 
Non-chaebol firms 
(N=496) t-test Wicoxon z-test 
Total asset (billion won) 610.83 [156.78] 
1642.30 
[776.08] 
303.05 
[113.38] 0.0001 0.0001 
Total debt / total assets 0.7217 [0.6996] 
0.7747 
[0.7840] 
0.7059 
[0.6616] 0.0002 0.0001 
    Bank loans / total assets 0.3343 [0.3194] 
0.3146 
[0.3156] 
0.3402 
[0.3216] 0.0593 0.1659 
    Loans from the main bank / 
    total assets 
0.0947 
[0.0455] 
0.0473 
[0.0236] 
0.1092 
[0.0555] 0.0007 0.0001 
    Bond / total assets 0.2068 [0.1834] 
0.2239 
[0.1993] 
0.2018 
[0.1787] 0.1377 0.0378 
    Foreign debt / total assets 0.0741 [0.0343] 
0.0922 
[0.0580] 
0.0687 
[0.0258] 0.0279 0.0006 
Cash flow (operating income +      
depreciation) / total assets 
0.0524 
[0.0544] 
0.0547 
[0.0555] 
0.0517 
[0.0539] 0.4504 0.0001 
Liquid assets (cash + marketable   
securities) / total assets 
0.0953 
[0.0697] 
0.0553 
[0.0347] 
0.1073 
[0.0842] 0.0001 0.7682 
One year market-adjusted cumulative 
excess returns  
0.4874 
[0.2843] 
0.1931 
[0.0272] 
0.5813 
[0.3725] 0.0001 0.0001 
Tobin’s Q 1.0992 [0.9977] 
1.0234 
[0.9613] 
1.1218 
[1.0203] 0.0053 0.0001 
Beta 0.8521 [0.9151] 
0.9194 
[0.9713] 
0.8306 
[0.8962] 0.0025 0.0031 
Market model residual variance 0.0007 [0.0007] 
0.0005 
[0.0005] 
0.0007 
[0.0007] 0.0001 0.0001 
Individual ownership 
 
20.2416 
[20.02] 
9.0342 
[4.92] 
23.4977 
[23.83] 0.0001 0.0001 
Ownership by other 
affiliated firms 
9.0024 
[0.00] 
17.5226 
[15.60] 
6.5270 
[0.00] 0.0001 0.0001 
Equity ownership by 
controlling 
shareholders (%) 
Total 29.2440 [28.09] 
26.5568 
[24.67] 
30.0247 
[28.78] 0.0177 0.0060 
Equity ownership by banks (%) 8.2256 [5.97] 
13.5932 
[12.64] 
6.6218 
[4.61] 0.0001 0.0001 
Equity ownership by other financial  
institutions (%)  
2.1988 
[0.21] 
4.4036 
[2.17] 
1.5400 
[0] 0.0001 0.0001 
Equity ownership by other unaffiliated  
firms (%) 
16.8257 
[12.43] 
26.1704 
[24.88] 
14.0337 
[9.95] 0.0001 0.0001 
Equity ownership by foreigners (%) 4.8200 [1.49] 
7.2067 
[4.08] 
4.1069 
[1.03] 0.0001 0.0001 
Exports / sales 0.2829 [0.1587] 
0.2818 
[0.1859] 
0.2832 
[0.1443] 0.8478 0.3980 
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Table 2 
Holding period returns (HPRs) around the economic shock. 
 
The sample includes 644 nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) between November 
1997 and December 1998. The holding period returns are computed as buy-and-hold returns. November 18, 1997 is 
set as an event date (day 0) on which IMF proposed the rescue package to Korea to help the financial crisis that had 
started in the middle of November 1997. Chaebol firms are those that belong to one of the 30 largest business groups in 
Korea. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics to test for the null hypothesis of zero means. Numbers in brackets 
denote the medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
By chaebol affiliation 
Test of difference (p-value) Periods Total samples (N=644) Chaebol firms 
(N=148) 
Non-chaebol firms 
(N=496) t-test Wilcoxon z-test 
(-5, 32) 
 -0.5197*** 
 (-55.87) 
[-0.5641]*** 
 -0.4739*** 
 (-48.99) 
[-0.5078]*** 
 -0.5334*** 
 (-27.80) 
[-0.5797]*** 
0.0035 0.0001 
(-1, 0) 
 -0.0599*** 
 (-29.45) 
[-0.0641]*** 
 -0.0478*** 
 (-26.95) 
[-0.0468]*** 
 -0.0635*** 
 (-12.43) 
[-0.0691]*** 
0.0006 0.0001 
(-1, 1) 
 -0.0569*** 
 (-22.86) 
[-0.0583]*** 
 -0.0345*** 
 (-22.67) 
[-0.0364]*** 
 -0.0636*** 
  (-6.95) 
[-0.0675]*** 
0.0001 0.0003 
(-5, 5) 
 -0.2069*** 
 (-51.04) 
[-0.2127]*** 
 -0.1821*** 
 (-45.54) 
[-0.1943]*** 
 -0.2143*** 
 (-24.05) 
[-0.2194]*** 
0.0004 0.0001 
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Table 3  
OLS regression of the holding period returns (-5, 32) on firm characteristics. 
 
The sample includes 644 nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) between November 
1997 and December 1998. The dependent variable is the holding period return (-5, +32). November 18, 1997 is set as 
an event date (day 0) on which IMF proposed the rescue package to Korea to help the financial crisis that had started in 
the middle of November 1997. Independent variables are the values at the end of fiscal year 1996 except for 
market-adjusted cumulative excess return, beta, and market model residual variance. The no guaranteed bond issue 
dummy takes the value of one if a firm’s debt includes public bonds that are not guaranteed by the third party. The 
depositary receipt dummy takes the value of one if the firm’s stock is listed abroad. Cash flow is computed as the sum 
of operating income and depreciation. Liquid assets are cash plus marketable securities. Beta is estimated by the slope 
of the market model regression, using one-year daily returns during 1996. The chaebol dummy takes the value of one 
if the firm belongs to one of the 30 largest business groups in Korea. Equity ownership by controlling shareholders is 
the sum of equity ownership by the largest shareholder and by other affiliated firms. Equity ownership by other 
financial institutions includes equity ownership by financial institutions excluding banks and securities companies. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -0.6121***  (-2.86) 
-0.8813*** 
 (-4.03) 
-0.8075*** 
 (-3.46) 
-1.0397*** 
 (-5.73) 
-1.3747*** 
 (-5.55) 
Log (total assets)  0.0429***   (5.72) 
 0.0479*** 
  (6.82) 
0.0433*** 
(5.67) 
0.0380*** 
 (4.38) 
0.0493*** 
 (3.97) 
Total debt / total assets -0.0672**  (-2.34)    
-0.1000** 
(-2.01) 
Bank loans / total debt -0.2086***  (-3.33)     
Loans from main banks /  
total debt      
-0.1287* 
 (-1.80) 
Loans from other banks  
/ total debt     
-0.1123 
 (-1.59) 
Bond / total debt -0.4427***  (-7.96)    
-0.2947*** 
 (-4.52) 
Foreign debt / total debt  0.0924   (0.96)    
-0.0211 
 (-0.20) 
No guaranteed bond 
issue dummy 
 0.0014 
  (0.04)    
0.0275 
 (0.72) 
Depositary receipt  
dummy 
 0.1942*** 
  (3.18)    
0.1508** 
 (2.27) 
Cash flow / total assets  0.6426*** (4.18)   
1.1939*** 
(4.44) 
Liquid assets / total 
assets  
0.4402*** 
(3.79)   
0.2918** 
(2.25) 
Market-adjusted    
cumulative excess returns   
 0.0103 
  (0.88)  
0.0003 
(0.02) 
Positive operating 
income dummy   
 0.0524* 
  (1.71)  
-0.0631 
 (-1.57) 
Tobin’s q    0.0549**   (2.05)  
0.0999** 
(2.72) 
Beta    -0.1523***  (-5.29) 
-0.0920** 
 (-2.49) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Market model residual  
variance    
-95.6141*** 
 (-2.62) 
-2.3370 
 (-0.04) 
Chaebol dummy (A)     -0.0002 (-0.01) 
Equity ownership by  
controlling shareholders 
(B) 
    0.0001 (0.13) 
(A)×(B)     -0.0016  (-0.96) 
Equity ownership by banks     -0.0032**  (-1.84) 
Equity ownership by other 
financial institutions     
 0.0059* 
(1.90) 
Equity ownership by other  
unaffiliated firms     
 0.0011 
  (1.47) 
Equity ownership by  
foreigners     
 0.0060*** 
  (4.17) 
Exports / sales      0.0595*   (1.67) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1850 0.1405 0.1102 0.1141 0.2868 
F- value 14.164 14.741 8.975 13.677 8.010 
Number of sample 638 638 588 590 570 
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Table 4 
Frequency of restructuring actions following the economic shock 
 
The sample includes 644 nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) between November 
1997 and December 1998. Data on reported actions are obtained from Chosun Daily and Korea Economic Daily during 
November 1997 to December 1998. “%” is the ratio of the number of the firms that undertake a certain action to the 
number of total firms in that sample. The classification of actions is not mutually exclusive, so firms reporting multiple 
different actions are included more than once in the table. 
 
Total firms 
(N = 644) 
Chaebol firms 
(N = 148) 
Non-chaebol firms 
(N = 496) Actions 
Number % Number % Number % 
1. Asset downsizing actions 
(1) Asset (stocks, real estate, business lines) sales 
(2) Investment cut  
(3) Close plant or suspend operations  
(4) Withdraw from line of business 
(5) Multiple downsizing actions 
    (1) and other downsizing 
    Other multiple actions 
273 
 181 
    9 
    8 
    5 
 
56 
14 
42.4 
 28.1 
  1.4 
  1.2 
  0.8 
 
  8.7 
  2.2 
 126 
  62 
    6 
    1 
    1 
 
56 
  0 
85.2 
41.9 
  4.1 
  0.7 
  0.7 
 
37.8 
  0.0 
147 
119 
    3 
    7 
    4 
 
  0 
14 
29.6 
24.0 
  0.6 
  1.4 
  0.8 
 
  0.0 
  2.8 
2. Employment  changes 
(1) Layoffs 
(2) Pay cut  
(3)   Multiple changes 
  80 
  32 
  23 
  25 
12.4 
  5.0 
  3.6 
  3.8 
68 
20 
23 
25 
45.9 
13.5 
15.5 
16.9 
12 
12 
  0 
  0 
2.4 
2.4 
0.0 
0.0 
3. Expansionary actions 
(1) Joint venture and strategic alliance 
(2) Mergers and acquisitions 
(3) New facility construction or new line of business  
(4) Increase output/R&D, expand existing production 
facilities or marketing channels/new production 
(5) Multiple expansionary actions 
    (1) and other expansionary actions 
    Other multiple actions 
  107 
   17 
     5 
   22 
   27 
 
 
19 
17 
16.6 
  2.6 
  0.8 
  3.4 
  4.2 
  
 
3.0 
2.6 
66 
   3 
   1 
 13 
 13 
 
  
19 
 17 
44.6 
  2.0 
  0.7 
  8.8 
  8.8 
 
 
12.8 
11.5 
41 
 14 
   4 
   9 
 14 
 
 
0 
0 
8.4 
2.8 
0.8 
1.8 
2.8 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
4. Internal reorganization 
(1) Strengthen the core business, reorganize subsidiaries/ 
units, or change organizational structures 
(2) Cost cut or outsourcing 
(3) Reorganize existing production process or 
strengthen alliance with other firms 
(4) Multiple internal reorganization actions 
    (1) and other internal reorganization  
    Other multiple actions 
136 
   91 
 
     4 
   14 
 
 
25 
  2 
21.1 
14.1 
 
  0.6 
  2.2 
 
 
 3.9 
 0.3 
90 
 63 
 
  3 
  3 
 
 
 20 
   1 
60.8 
42.6 
 
  2.0 
  2.0 
 
 
13.5 
  0.7 
46 
28 
 
  1 
11 
 
 
5 
1 
9.3 
5.7 
 
0.2 
2.2 
 
 
    1.0 
    0.2 
5. Changes in internal control 
(1) Top management turnover 
(2) Introduction or expansion of outside board of 
directors system 
(3) Remove a central staff within the group or 
establish  independent board of directors system 
(4)  Multiple changes in internal control 
    (1) and other changes   
    (2) and other changes 
    Other multiple actions 
94 
7 
1 
 
26 
 
 
9 
36 
15 
14.6 
  1.1 
 0.0 
 
 4.0 
 
 
   1.4 
   5.6 
   2.3 
93 
7 
0 
 
26 
 
 
9 
36 
15 
63.5 
  4.7 
  0.0 
 
17.6 
 
 
  6.1 
24.3 
10.1 
1 
0 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
6. Taken over by other firms 
(1) Taken over by affiliate firms 
(2)   Taken over by non-affiliated firms 
30 
19 
11 
4.9 
3.0 
1.9 
15 
  9 
  6 
10.2 
  6.1 
  4.1 
15 
10 
  5 
3.0 
2.0 
1.0 
7. Others 
(1) Change accounting methods 
(2)   Issue foreign bonds, change company names 
61 
55 
6 
9.4 
8.5 
0.9 
18 
17 
1 
12.2 
11.5 
  0.7 
43 
38 
5 
8.7 
7.7 
1.0 
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Table 5  
Logit estimates of the likelihood of restructuring activities following the economic shock 
 
The sample includes 644 nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) between November 1997 and 
December 1998. The dependent variable is set to one if a particular restructuring occurs and zero otherwise. Independent variables 
are those in Table 3 and are calculated as the values at the end of fiscal years immediately before the restructuring announcement. 
The holding period returns are buy-hold returns (-5, +32). November 18, 1997 is set as an event date (day 0) on which IMF 
proposed the rescue package to Korea to help the financial crisis that had started in the middle of November 1997. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Downsizing and expansionary actions 
Downsizing (asset downsizing  
or employment changes) 
Expansion 
 
Expansion without 
downsizing  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept   -19.1050*** (0.0001) 
  -15.5838*** 
(0.0001) 
  -19.9244*** 
(0.0001) 
    -8.5923*** 
(0.0041) 
 -4.9876* 
(0.0915) 
5.8940 
(0.3065) 
Log (total assets)      1.0066*** (0.0001) 
     0.7226*** 
(0.0001) 
      0.9296*** 
(0.0001) 
    0.4180*** 
(0.0023) 
0.1448 
(0.3061) 
-0.2733 
(0.2974) 
Holding period returns     -1.3587*** (0.0042)  
0.6503 
(0.3226)  
0.6682 
(0.5399) 
Total debt / total assets (A) -0.1530 (0.6421) 
-0.3766 
(0.4719) 
0.2257 
(0.6651) 
0.3236 
(0.7265) 
-0.5286 
(0.5351) 
-1.3737 
(0.4384) 
Bank loans / total debt    1.0928* (0.0689)  
0.4611 
(0.6218)  
0.6120 
(0.6757) 
Foreign debt / total debt  -0.8454 (0.3015)  
-1.8474 
(0.1121)  
-0.9207 
(0.7603) 
Cash Flow / total assets -0.9587 (0.4734) 
-0.8146 
(0.6078) 
1.0176 
(0.6323) 
-1.0833 
(0.6920) 
-0.7039 
(0.8155) 
-1.6949 
(0.6797) 
Liquid assets / total assets  -3.0917*** (0.0058) 
-0.9537 
(0.4459) 
0.5926 
(0.7270) 
0.0785 
(0.9678) 
0.2259 
(0.9321) 
-1.5510 
(0.7031) 
Tobin’s q  0.2020 (0.5377)  
0.0933 
(0.8607)  
-0.9207 
(0.7603) 
Beta  0.2317 (0.5148)  
0.7700 
(0.1760)  
0.8709 
(0.3681) 
Market model residual variance  55.0289 (0.4117)  
    -2104.3*** 
(0.0001)  
 -1393.9* 
(0.0504) 
Depositary receipt dummy  -0.4742 (0.4230)  
  1.0354* 
(0.0808)  
0.6273 
(0.7052) 
Chaebol dummy (B)       3.9637*** (0.0001)  
-1.6463 
(0.2414)  
 -4.7001* 
(0.0780) 
Equity ownership by 
controlling shareholders (C)  
-0.0086 
(0.2502)  
   -0.0291** 
(0.0315)  
-0.0331 
(0.1469) 
(A)×(B)   -2.1542* (0.0667)  
  2.6575* 
(0.0990)  
    6.3616** 
(0.0279) 
(B)×(C)   -0.0195* (0.0929)  
  0.0300* 
(0.0715)  
0.0411 
(0.1560) 
Equity ownership by banks  0.0082 (0.5314)  
-0.0336* 
(0.0727)  
-0.0591 
(0.1332) 
Equity ownership by other 
financial institutions  
 0.0501* 
(0.0640)  
0.0294 
(0.3716)  
-0.0345 
(0.6428) 
Equity ownership by other 
unaffiliated firms  
     0.0165*** 
(0.0021)  
   0.0154** 
(0.0481)  
-0.0145 
(0.3386) 
Equity ownership by foreigners    0.0212** (0.0376)  
-0.0220 
(0.2326)  
-0.0129 
(0.6925) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of sample 434 406 133 124 30 27 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Other restructuring actions 
Internal reorganization Change in internal control  
Top management 
turnover  
Taken over by other 
firms   
(7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept    -17.1604*** (0.0001) 
 -16.4201*** 
(0.0001) 
 -15.6628** 
(0.0212) 
 -2.6418 
(0.6272) 
Log (total assets)       0.7453*** (0.0001) 
     0.6572*** 
(0.0001) 
    0.6813** 
(0.0238) 
- 0.0115 
(0.9462) 
Holding period returns      -1.9253*** (0.0080) 
1.0077 
(0.2040) 
0.7290 
(0.6805) 
 -0.5833 
(0.6880) 
Total debt / total assets (A) -0.5609 (0.6127) 
  2.6938** 
(0.0229) 
-0.4432 
(0.8884) 
 -4.5518* 
(0.0615) 
Bank loans / total debt 0.5179 (0.5450) 
-0.0273 
(0.9789) 
2.5573 
(0.2823) 
2.8755 
(0.1198) 
Foreign debt / total debt -0.3890 (0.7177) 
-1.1492 
(0.3750) 
-5.0276 
(0.1126) 
  3.5310* 
(0.0666) 
Cash Flow / total assets -1.2033 (0.6112) 
-0.3364 
(0.9124) 
6.3312 
(0.3675) 
-3.4498 
(0.4452) 
Liquid assets / total assets -2.3962 (0.2428) 
-2.5660 
(0.2919) 
-7.9239 
(0.2526) 
 -9.0475* 
(0.0515) 
Tobin’s q -0.1328 (0.8332) 
-1.6654 
(0.1313) 
-2.4170 
(0.3306) 
0.6566 
(0.3224) 
Beta  1.0356* (0.0550) 
  1.6484** 
(0.0250) 
  0.3223 
(0.8193) 
0.6106 
(0.5565) 
Market model residual variance  133.9 (0.1301) 
-409.3 
(0.3082) 
190.1 
(0.3970) 
267.9 
(0.1882) 
Depositary receipt dummy     -1.8103*** (0.0089) 
-0.2279 
(0.7190) 
-0.6611 
(0.7316) 
0.2080 
(0.9035) 
Chaebol dummy (B)      4.3190*** (0.0009) - - 
-0.5035 
(0.8343) 
Equity ownership by 
controlling shareholders (C) 
0.0027 
(0.8328) 
0.0093 
(0.3049) 
0.0047 
(0.8120) 
 -0.0631* 
(0.0605) 
(A)×(B) -2.3573 (0.1144) - - 
3.3197 
(0.2571) 
(B)×(C) -0.0148 (0.3590) - - 
0.0213 
(0.5860) 
Equity ownership by banks    -0.0439** (0.0159) 
0.0310 
(0.1154) 
-0.0012 
(0.9815) 
-0.1012* 
(0.0625) 
Equity ownership by other 
financial institutions 
0.0390 
(0.2290) 
   0.0872** 
(0.0117) 
0.0294 
(0.7646) 
-0.0154 
(0.8752) 
Equity ownership by other 
unaffiliated firms 
0.0092 
(0.2046) 
     0.0415*** 
(0.0001) 
     0.0403*** 
(0.0087) 
  0.0223* 
(0.0874) 
Equity ownership by foreigners 0.0142 (0.3048) 
0.0201 
(0.2512) 
     0.0756*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0089 
(0.7228) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of sample 150 109 15 23 
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Table  6  
Mean and median cumulative abnormal returns [CAR (-5, 5)] for firms around the restructuring announcement date 
 
The sample includes restructuring announcement events made by nonfinancial firms that are listed on the Korean Stock Exchange 
(KSE) between November 1997 and December 1998. The CARs from day –5 to day +5 are computed as the difference between 
realized returns and estimated returns, using the market model over the pre-event period of day -220 to day –21. The initial public 
announcement date of the restructuring activities of firms is identified from two daily newspapers, Chosun Daily and Korean 
Economic Daily. The date that a news announcement first appeared in either of these two publications is use as the announcement 
date. To avoid having results confounded by multiple events that cluster during a short time period, those events that occur within 
five calendar days after the first event are eliminated. Other activities include the change in the corporate name, the accounting 
procedure, etc. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics and numbers in brackets are the medians. Numbers in parentheses of the last 
column are p-values for the test of equality of means and those in brackets are p-values of the Wilcoxon Z-test for equality of 
medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Cumulative abnormal return (-5,5)  
 
Total sample Chaebol firms  (A) 
Non-chaebol firms 
(B) 
Test of difference  
(A-B) 
Downsizing policies  
  0.0247*** 
(2.52) 
  [0.0055]*** 
(n=481) 
     0.0260** 
(2.16) 
[-0.0131] 
(n=296) 
0.0226 
(1.35) 
     [0.0447]*** 
(n=185) 
0.0034 
(0.8716) 
[0.0519]* 
Asset sales 
   0.0425*** 
(3.27) 
  [0.0243]*** 
(n=311) 
   0.0628*** 
(3.37) 
[0.0116]** 
(n=161) 
   0.0208*** 
(1.15) 
[0.0437]** 
(n=150) 
0.0420 
(0.1007)* 
[0.4701] 
Other downsizing 
-0.0116 
(-0.83) 
[-0.0155] 
(n=170) 
-0.0150 
(-1.14) 
[-0.0232]* 
(n=135) 
0.0009 
(0.02) 
[0.0138] 
(n=35) 
-0.0159 
(0.6378) 
[0.0670]* 
Expansion policies 
0.0033 
(0.25) 
[0.0031] 
(n=194) 
-0.0142 
(-0.89) 
[-0.0112] 
(n=145) 
 0.0553** 
(2.23) 
[0.0354]** 
(n=49) 
-0.0695 
(0.0204)** 
[0.0612]* 
Diversified expansion 
-0.1080** 
(-2.31) 
[-0.0287] 
(n=31) 
  -0.1599** 
(-2.70) 
[-0.0702]** 
(n=23) 
0.0412 
(1.13) 
[0.0578] 
(n=8) 
0.2011 
(0.0579)* 
  [0.0320]** 
Expansion without downsizing 
0.0272 
(1.11) 
[-0.0184] 
(n=22) 
-0.0222 
(-0.68) 
[-0.0198] 
(n=6) 
0.0426 
(1.42) 
[0.0201] 
(n=16) 
-0.0648 
(0.1705) 
[0.3859] 
Internal reorganization 
   0.0347** 
(2.26) 
[0.0133]* 
(n=171) 
   0.0374** 
(2.13) 
[0.0115] 
(n=128) 
0.0266 
(0.83) 
[0.0142] 
(n=43) 
0.0108 
(0.7683) 
[0.8966] 
Change in internal control  
-0.0147 
(-0.95) 
[-0.0141] 
(n=131) 
  
Top management turnover  
0.0317 
(0.58) 
[0.0226] 
(n=16) 
  
Other changes in internal control  
  -0.0206 
(-1.28) 
[-0.0176] 
(n=115) 
  
Taken over by other firms 
 0.0871* 
(1.91) 
[0.0600]* 
(n=30) 
 0.0978* 
(1.83) 
[0.0691]* 
(n=15) 
0.0776 
(1.06) 
[–0.0128] 
(n=15) 
0.0202 
(0.2846) 
[0.1354] 
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Table 7  
Industry-adjusted operating performance following downsizing and expansionary actions 
 
The sample consists of 157 nonfinancial Korean firms that undertake downsizing actions without having expansion 
and 22 nonfinancial Korean firms that undertake expansionary actions without downsizing between November 1997 
and December 1998. The industry-adjusted ratio of operating income to total assets  is measured as the difference in 
the ratio of operating income to total assets between the sample firm and the median firm in the same two-digit SIC 
code. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics and numbers in brackets are the medians. Numbers in parentheses of the 
last column and the last row are p-values for the test of equality of means and those in brackets are p-values of the 
Wilcoxon Z-test for equality of medians. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Downsizing without expansion  
 Total sample 
(n = 157) 
Chaebol firms (A) 
(n = 53) 
Non-chaebol firms (B) 
(n = 104) 
Test of difference 
(A-B) 
Year 0 
(Restructuring 
announcement year) 
-0.0107* 
(-1.72) 
[-0.0073]* 
-0.0128 
(-1.51) 
[-0.0114]* 
-0.0096 
(-1.15) 
[-0.0066] 
-0.0032 
(0.7827) 
[0.4567] 
Year +1 
0.0140* 
(1.69) 
[-0.0010] 
0.0120 
(1.10) 
[0.0063] 
0.1506 
(1.34) 
[-0.0045] 
-0.1386 
(0.8459) 
[0.3840] 
Year +2 
0.0171** 
(2.07) 
[0.0038]* 
0.0223** 
(2.45) 
[0.0307]* 
0.0145 
(1.24) 
[0.0034] 
0.0078 
(0.5961) 
[0.4152] 
Year  0 to Year +1 
0.0034 
(0.48) 
[-0.0086]** 
-0.0008 
(-0.07) 
[-0.0089] 
0.0055 
(0.62) 
[-0.0067] 
-0.0063 
(0.6604) 
[0.7369] 
Year  0 to Year +2 
0.0205** 
(2.03) 
[0.0005] 
0.0215 
(1.56) 
[0.0010] 
0.0199 
(1.47) 
[-0.0012] 
0.0016 
(0.9378) 
[0.4726] 
Expansion without downsizing 
 Total sample 
(n = 22) 
Chaebol firms (A) 
(n =6 ) 
Non-chaebol firms (B) 
(n = 16) 
Test of difference 
(A-B) 
Year 0 
(Restructuring 
announcement year) 
-0.0243 
(-1.56) 
[-0.0059] 
-0.0809** 
(-2.35) 
[-0.0404]*** 
-0.0043 
(-0.28) 
[0.0038] 
-0.0766 
(0.0807) 
[0.0459] 
Year +1 
0.0176* 
(2.09) 
[0.0077]** 
0.0186 
(1.63) 
[0.0077] 
0.0173 
(1.68) 
[0.0100]* 
0.0013 
(0.9220) 
[0.6031] 
Year +2 
-0.0169 
(-0.73) 
[-0.0002] 
0.0049 
(1.10) 
[0.0008] 
-0.0221 
(-0.77) 
[-0.0079] 
0.0270 
(0.3666) 
[0.5603] 
Year 0 to Year +1 
0.0073 
(0.70) 
[0.0242] 
-0.0101 
(-0.73) 
[-0.0159] 
0.0116 
(0.93) 
[0.0273] 
-0.0217 
(0.2744) 
[0.2874] 
Year 0 to Year +2 
-0.0185 
(-0.80) 
[0.0154] 
-0.0052 
(-0.32) 
[-0.0069] 
-0.0219 
(-0.75) 
[0.0154] 
0.0167 
(0.6204) 
[0.7408] 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 48 
Major events during the Korean financial crisis (November 1997 ~ December 1997) 
 
November 2, 1997 Haetae business group announces its default.  
November 6, 1997 Union Bank of Switzerland warns the possibility of financial crisis in Korea. 
November 18, 1997 IMF proposes the rescue fund to Korea. Korea abandons the defense of its 
currency. The Korean Stock Price Index plunges to below 500. 
November 22, 1997 Korean government seeks a rescue package from the IMF to control the 
financial crisis. 
December 06, 1997 Korean government and IMF agree on the terms of the rescue package.  
December 07, 1997 Koryo Securities Co. announces its default. 
December 09, 1997 Halla business group, Korea’s twelfth largest conglomerate, announces its 
default. 
December 10, 1997 Korean government announces the nationalization of the Korea First Bank and 
the Seoul Bank. 
December 11, 1997 Korean government closes five merchant banks. 
December 12, 1997 Korean government closes Dongseo Securities Co. 
December 13, 1997 Bank of Korea provides special rescue loans to commercial banks and securities  
                                       companies. 
December 23, 1997 Moody’s downgrades the sovereign rating of Korea. 
December 24, 1997 S&P downgrades the sovereign rating of Korea into Junk bond level. 
   Korean won plunges to over 2000 per dollar. 
December 25, 1997 IMF and G-7 countries make $US 10 billion available to Korea. 
December 31, 1997 The world’s 13 major banks agree to roll over short-term debt of Korea by an 
additional month.  
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